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Abstract
Experimental sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing
bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given. The concept
of weighted impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a principle of ex-post rationality and
incorporates a concern for social comparison, captures the data.
 2004 Elsevier Inc.
JEL classification: C7; C9
Keywords: Auctions; Feedback; Learning; Overbidding; Experiments; Ex-post rationality; Bounded rationality;
Social comparison
1. Introduction
Feedback in a repeated auction environment can substantially affect outcomes, even
when the feedback has no strategic information value. As a consequence, the feedback
made available to the bidders is an important design variable. This paper experimentally
investigates sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values under different feedback
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156 A. Ockenfels, R. Selten / Games and Economic Behavior 51 (2005) 155–170conditions. A novel, behaviorally founded equilibrium concept captures the observed bids’
sensitivity to feedback.
Isaac and Walker (1985) compare sealed-bid private-value first-price auctions with four
bidders, in which feedback is given only on the price, to other auctions in which bidders
are additionally informed about the losing bids after the auction. They find that prices
generated with limited feedback are higher than those generated under the full feedback
condition. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002), independently of our study, investigate sealed-
bid first-price auctions with and without feedback on losing bids in a common value
environment (the value was identical to all bidders, which was commonly known), and
also find the revenue-reducing effect of feedback on losing bids. In this paper, we provide
further support of the feedback effect in private value auctions with two competing bidders.
Taken together, these studies suggest that the examined feedback conditions elicit a robust
behavioral effect.1 Yet, the effect cannot easily be explained by standard notions of rational
bidding, because in all experiments, the strategic links between successive auctions were
minimized. In particular, bidders were rematched into new bidder groups from auction to
auction, and bidders’ values were either identical and commonly known, or for each bidder
and in each auction independently drawn.
While Isaac and Walker (1985) do not attempt to theoretically explain their observa-
tion, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) argue intuitively that, while the feedback effect is
inconsistent with standard theory, it may be in line with a certain form of signaling behav-
ior.2 In this paper, as an alternative, we propose an equilibrium explanation. However, our
approach is very different from standard economic equilibrium models. It is based on the
concept of weighted impulse balance that is in turn based on a simple principle of ex-post
rationality similar to Selten and Stoecker’s (1986) learning direction theory (see Selten,
1998, and the references cited therein for evidence). Weighted impulse balance involves
one parameter that might, in our auction context, be interpreted as a measure of concern
for relative standing.3 It organizes the feedback effect—along with the fact that bids in
first-price auctions tend to be higher than at risk neutral Nash equilibrium4—quite well,
both qualitatively and quantitatively.
1 Cox et al. (1984) and Battalio et al. (1990), however, find no effect of relatively minor variations in their
information conditions on bidding behavior (Kagel, 1995, Chapter IE; see also Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000).
2 Plott (1982) discusses related signaling hypotheses that have been put forward in very early experimental
industrial organization work; for more recent related work see also Huck et al. (2000).
3 As will become clear later, the model’s parameter can also be interpreted in terms of a ‘utility of winning,’ a
kind of ‘loss aversion,’ or a mix of these and related concerns. Our data do not allow distinguishing between these
concerns. However, recent evidence by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Morgan
et al. (2003) suggests that the social comparison explanation of our parameter is likely to be part of the right
interpretation.
4 Bidding above risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE), a phenomenon called ‘overbidding,’ is well studied.
Cox et al. (1982) proposed the constant relative risk averse model (CRRAM) to account for overbidding. The
model assumes that subjects maximize the expected value of a utility of the form u(x) = xr , where u is the
utility index, x is the amount of money gained, and r is the risk aversion parameter. Bidders are assumed to
play Nash equilibrium strategies on this basis. The model is consistent with overbidding (see Cox et al., 1988),
but a number of studies challenged CRRAM’s explanation (see, e.g., Harrison, 1989; Kagel and Levine, 1993;
Kagel and Roth, 1992; Kagel, 1995, surveys the discussions). However, neither risk aversion nor social utility
models based on full rationality provide different predictions for each of our treatments.
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The model underlying the experiment is a symmetric sealed-bid first-price auction with
private values. The values v1 and v2 of the two bidders 1 and 2, respectively, are uniformly
and independently distributed over the interval [0, 100]. (Actually, values were decimal
numbers with at most two digits after the decimal point.) Both bidders simultaneously
and independently make bids b1 and b2, respectively. The higher bid bj wins the auction,
and the profit of the winner j is vj − bj . The loser receives nothing. In case of a tie,
b1 = b2, the auction winner is selected randomly. In order to avoid losses bids above the
value are not permitted (of course, such bids would be dominated in the game theoretic
sense), but otherwise no restrictions are imposed on bids. After each auction, each bidder
is informed about whether he won the auction, the price, and his payment for that auction.
Under treatment NF no additional feedback is given, but under treatment F feedback on
the opponent’s bid is supplied to the winner of the auction. Altogether eight sessions with
12 subjects each were run for 140 rounds with one auction in each round. The subjects of
one session belonged to two independent subject groups of six participants each.
For reasons that will become clear later, the 140 rounds were divided into 28 weeks
with five rounds each. At the beginning of each week a value was drawn randomly for each
subject. Then each subject played against the five other participants of the same subject
group in a random order, with the commonly known restriction that a subject could not be
matched with the same opponent twice in a row. The subjects did not know about the divi-
sion into two independent subject groups. The impression was conveyed that in each week
they would play against opponents randomly selected among the other eleven participants
(see Appendix A for the instructions given to the subjects). The interaction was anony-
mous and formal via computer terminals, utilizing Fischbacher’s (1998) z-Tree software
tool. The computers were placed in three-sided cubicles, and neither the other subjects nor
the experiment’s monitor could watch anyone make their choices. In total, 96 subjects par-
ticipated in four sessions under treatment NF and four sessions under treatment F , yielding
eight independent observations per treatment.
Each money unit in the experiment was worth 2 German Pfennige (approximately
1 American or 1 European cent). The total payoff of each subject was the sum of his win-
nings over all 140 auctions plus 10 German Marks show up fee. No session lasted longer
than 1.5 hours and average payoffs were 49 German Marks ($23) with a standard deviation
of 11 German Marks ($5).
3. Experimental results
3.1. Overbidding and feedback effect
Figure 1 shows the actual average relative bids in weeks 1 to 28 separately for the two
treatments F (with feedback on losing bid) and NF (without feedback on losing bid), as
well as the average relative bids predicted by the risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE).
The relative bid of a subject in a round is his bid as a percentage of his value. The average
relative bid in a week is the average of all relative bids of all subjects under the same
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treatment F or NF in this week. Therefore, each data point in the graphic corresponds to
240 bids (and 48 values) of eight groups of six subjects for five rounds. In the risk neutral
Nash equilibrium, the relative bid in a two-person auction is 50 percent regardless of the
feedback condition.5
Figure 1 shows that with the exception of the first week the curve for feedback treat-
ment F is entirely below the curve for treatment NF, and that the line for the risk neutral
Nash equilibrium is entirely below the line for treatment F . The overall average relative
bids are 63.1 percent for treatment NF and 57.2 percent for treatment F . The one-sided
Mann–Whitney U test applied to average relative bids of subject groups rejects the null
hypothesis of equal average relative bids across treatments F and NF at the three per-
cent level. A similar comparison of average revenues or, in other words, of average high
bids yields significance at the one percent level. A comparison of actual relative bids and
the predictions of the risk neutral Nash equilibrium yields significance levels of 0.01 for
treatment NF and 0.04 for treatment F . Recall that these results are in line with earlier
findings. Bidding above RNNE (‘overbidding’) is the most common outcome in first-price
private value auctions (Kagel, 1995), and a comparison of the feedback conditions in the
four-bidder case by Isaac and Walker (1985) yielded an analogous feedback effect.6
5 We have chosen a figure showing average relative bids rather than other data since RNNE, CRRAM and
impulse balance theory all lead to constant predictions for average relative bids.
6 Isaac and Walker (1985, p. 141) conclude from their experimental findings that “Central to the results of
this study is the consistent evidence of the previous two studies (Walker et al., 1983, and DeJong et al., 1984)
which suggest that, in sealed bid (offer) auctions, the more limited the between market publicized information the
lower the profits for those making bids to buy. [. . .] If such evidence is found to be robust, this relationship has
important implications for the evolution of market institutions in private economies, as well as policy implications
for government implemented auctions.”
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Impulse balance theory, analogous to Selten and Stoecker’s (1986) learning direction
theory, postulates that the adjustment tends to follow a principle of ex-post rationality. It
applies to repeated decision tasks in which feedback information after each period permits
causal inferences about what might have been better last time. In our context, if a higher
(lower) bid in the last round might have been better, the bid tends to be increased (de-
creased) in the current round.7 In particular, in rounds 2 to 5 of a week in our experiment
a bidder can look back on his experience from the previous round with the same value,
facing one of three possible experience conditions:
• Lost opportunity: The own bid was smaller than the price, but the value was higher
than the price.
• Overpayment: The own bid won.
• Outpriced value: The price was higher than the own value.
Fixing values within weeks allows us to derive predictions about bid changes. In par-
ticular, ex-post rationality suggests that, for a given value, the bid will tend to increase in
the lost opportunity condition, while it will tend to decrease in the overpayment condition
(because in this case a smaller bid might have been sufficient in order to win the auction).
In the outpriced value condition, ex-post rationality suggests an unchanged bid as the most
frequent response.
Table 1 shows the percentages of different responses to the three experience conditions
in rounds 2 to 5 of each week. Since there is no indication that these bid change patterns
differ across treatments, we present aggregate results only. The few cases in which both
bidders bid the same amount are not included.8 The prediction of ex-post rationality for
these 0.02 percent of all observations are different for treatments NF and F . Under treat-
Table 1
Experience conditions and bid changes
Experience condition Percent Change of bid (%)
(number) Increase Decrease Unchanged
Lost opportunity 22.6 57.5 12.1 30.4
(2415)
Overpayment 50.0 17.5 47.0 35.5
(5359)
Outpriced value 27.4 26.6 22.6 50.8
(2930)
7 Learning direction theory does not predict that every single change of the decision parameter will obey ex-
post rationality, but only that observed changes will be more than randomly expected in the indicated direction;
see Selten (1998) for a more general version of the theory.
8 Strictly speaking, because values were decimal numbers with two digits after the decimal point, not only the
tied bid case warrant special treatment but also the case where bidder 1 bids b and bidder 2 bids b + 0.01 or
b − 0.01. However, this never happened in our data set.
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he could have won at a lower price. Under treatment F , on the other hand, the case of equal
bid must be regarded as a separate experience condition, which, however, is not explored
explicitly in view of its very rare occurrence.
The most frequent responses to the different experience conditions are on the main
diagonal. The numbers in Table 1 cannot be taken at face value, however. Suppose that
the bid of a subject is determined by a constant bid function plus random error. If the
value is constant, a low bid is more likely to yield a lost opportunity than a high bid.
At the same time, a low bid is more likely to be followed by a higher bid than a high bid.
A similar argument applies to the overpayment condition and a subsequent decrease of the
bid. We refer to this as the “regression effect” because it reminds us of the regression to
the mean. The regression effect alone will already produce diagonal elements in the first
two data rows of Table 1 that are higher than randomly expected. In order to control for
the regression effect, we tested the hypothesis that bids change as a result of experience as
opposed to the hypothesis that the bids are a constant function of the value plus a random
term. Our test rejects the error model and indicates a strong and systematic influence of
experience (as predicted by the principle of ex-post rationality).9
The numbers on the main diagonal of Table 1 suggest that subjects do not respond
equally strongly to the experience conditions. In particular, the probability that a lost
opportunity is followed by a bid increase is greater, by about 10 percentage points,
than the probability that an overpayment is followed by a bid decrease. In fact, we
find that for 12 out of 16 independent subject groups the average surplus for the lost
opportunity condition is greater than that for the overpayment condition. By the bino-
mial test this is significant at the 2.7 percent level. Evidently, the lost opportunity con-
dition motivates subjects more strongly to change their bid in the expected direction
than the overpayment condition does. Many interpretations suggest themselves, includ-
ing a ‘utility of winning’ and social comparison processes. In particular, in the case
of lost opportunity the forgone profit is connected to an unfavorable relative stand-
ing because the competitor won the auction (see, e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Morgan et al., 2003). For a bidder who wins and therefore
experiences the overpayment condition, the forgone profit comes with an advantageous
relative standing. Thus, from the perspective of these social comparison models, responses
are conceivably stronger for the lost opportunity condition.10
9 For every subject and every week we considered all possible permutations with respect to the order of the
bids the subject made during that week, keeping the order of bids of the opponent constant. For each permutation
of the bids we counted how often we hit the main diagonal of Table 1. The surplus of a subject in a week is the
difference of the number of cases on the diagonal for the actual order of bids minus the average number in all
permutations. Learning direction theory predicts that this surplus tends to be positive, whereas the null hypothesis
states that the mean surplus is zero. For each of the 16 independent subject groups the average surplus over all
six subjects and all 28 weeks is positive. By the binomial test this result is significant on the one-percent level for
both treatments separately.
10 Cason and Friedman (1997) also identified stronger responses to upward impulses in two-sided sealed bid call
auctions.
A. Ockenfels, R. Selten / Games and Economic Behavior 51 (2005) 155–170 1614. Weighted impulse balance theory
4.1. Basic idea
Impulse balance theory is an attempt to make quantitative predictions about the cen-
tral tendency of the stationary distribution of bids on the basis of the principle of ex-post
rationality without making use of a full-fledged learning model.11 Thus, as described ear-
lier, impulse balance theory is applicable to situations in which a subject repeatedly has
to make a decision on the same parameter, and in which the feedback permits conclu-
sions about what would have been a better choice of the parameter in the last period. It
is postulated that the decision has a tendency to shift into the direction suggested by this
counterfactual comparison.
We speak of an upward impulse if a higher profit could have been made by a higher value
of the parameter but not by a lower one. Analogously, a downward impulse is experienced
if a higher profit could have been made by a lower value of the parameter but not by a
higher one. The strength of the impulse is the amount of forgone profit. The basic idea of
impulse balance theory is that the size of the shift of the parameter tends to be proportional
to the strength of the impulse. Formally, in our context, an impulse balance equilibrium
(henceforth IBE) is a bid function for each player, computed on the basis of balancing the
expected upward and downward impulses. Thus, the equilibrium bid functions should be
thought of in terms of reactions to the (balanced) impulses; they do not involve strategic
reactions to the opponents’ strategies.
In the following section we propose a modification of impulse balance theory that per-
mits different weights for downward and upward impulses. We shall define a weighted IBE
that depends on the parameter λ called the downward impulse weight. This parameter is the
number of upward impulse units equivalent to one downward impulse unit. The greater λ,
the more the average bid is drawn downward. Weighted impulse balance requires that the
expected upward impulse be equal to λ times the expected downward impulse. Thus, if
responses are stronger for upward impulses (that is, in our context, for the lost opportunity
condition), λ will be smaller than one.
When applying weighted impulse balance theory to our data, we must distinguish be-
tween treatments F and NF. Under treatment F the subjects see the amounts of upward
and downward impulses. A comparison of expected amounts is behaviorally reasonable.
Under treatment NF, however, the amount of the downward impulse is not visible to the
winner since feedback on the losing bid is not available. Therefore, under this treatment the
principle of weighted impulse cannot be applied to expected amounts of impulses. Instead
of this, we shall apply it to expected numbers of impulses. Under treatment NF subjects
11 Impulse balance theory has been first applied by Selten et al. (2002). Cason and Friedman (1997, 1999) also
extend the basic ideas of ex-post rationality and learning direction theory by relating how much offers change to
how much can be gained by changing offers in a two-sided sealed bid call auction, but do not further formalize
these ideas. Learning direction theory is related to adaptive learning models such as Crawford’s (1995) and learn-
ing models that take into account forgone payoffs such as Camerer and Ho’s (1999); see Chapter 6 in Camerer
(2003) for a survey of descriptive learning theories.
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are not visible in the case of downward impulses.
As an alternative to our impulse measure in treatment F one might also assume that
subjects (re)act as if they believe that the expected size of a downward impulse is equal to
the expected size of an (observable) upward impulse. This would not alter our results.
Assuming rational expectations with respect to the expected impulse sizes, however,
is inconsistent with both the nature of our model of boundedly rational decision making
and our experimental results, as we will demonstrate below. In this respect, it is important
to note that the application of IBE involves degrees of freedom. Yet, this also holds for
models of perfectly rational decision making. RNNE, for example, assumes risk neutrality,
and CRRAM constant relative risk aversion. These assumptions appear not more plausible
(or less critical to the model) than our assumptions about information processing.
4.2. The model
We look at a symmetric sealed-bid private-value first-price auction with n bidders.
(While in our experiments n = 2, the generalization in the model allows us to apply the
model to Isaac and Walker’s experimental setting with n = 4.) The values v are uniformly
and independently distributed over [0, 1]. Let x be the value of bidder 1 and y be the
maximum of the values of bidders 2 to n. Then, the density of y isf (y) = (n − 1)yn−2.
Moreover, let p be the price or, equivalently, the highest bid of all bidders. Our analysis
is based on the assumption that each bidder has the same homogeneously linear bidding
function b(v) = av with 0  a  1 where b(v) is the bid at the value v. The decision para-
meter responding to the impulses is the bid function parameter a. That is, bidders pick an
entire linear bid function in response to impulses rather than simply choose bids.
A different approach would be to define an IBE in terms of strategies for each value.
However, it is highly desirable from the perspective of learning theories that an observation
in one very specific situation has some impact on behavior in other situations (virtually all
learning theories have this property, including standard rational learning approaches). In
addition, from an empirical point of view, there is evidence that bid functions are adjusted
holistically in Selten and Buchta (1999).
A non-linear specification would be, while more difficult to solve, preferable. Note,
however, that alternative bidding models, RNNE and CRRAM, also lead to bidding func-
tions of this kind; for RNNE we have a = (n−1)/n, and CRRAM yields a = (n−1)/(n−
1 + r). Moreover, our own data and earlier empirical results suggest that linearity is a good
approximation of actual bidding functions (e.g., Cox et al., 1988), even if some deviations
like non-monotonicities can be observed (Selten and Buchta, 1999). Finally, as we will
show in Section 5.3, our linear model fits the data very well. Thus, a richer model could
not substantially increase the predictive success, but it would come at considerably higher
computational costs.
The diagram in Fig. 2 shows the value x of bidder 1 with 0 x  1 on the abscissa and
the maximum value y of the other bidders with 0 y  1 on the ordinate. We distinguish
three regions in this diagram. In region 1, x is greater than y so that bidder 1 wins. In this
region bidder 1 observes a downward impulse. In region 2, the maximum value of the
others is greater than bidder 1’s value, but the highest bid ay of the others is still smaller
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Regions Characterization F NF
Downward impulse: 1 p = ax > ay ax − ay not known
(overpayment)
Upward impulse: 2 p = ay < x x − ay x − ay
(lost opportunity)
No impulse p = ay > x 0 0
Fig. 2. Regions and amounts of impulses.
than x. Here, an upward impulse is observed. The remaining region corresponds to the
outpriced value condition in which there is no impulse. The table below the diagram in
Fig. 2 describes the three regions. The difference between the treatments F and NF is that
the amount of a downward impulse is not known.
4.3. Weighted impulse balance equilibrium under treatment F
The expected downward impulse E− is computed as follows:
E− = a
∫
1
(x − y)f (x)f (y)dx dy = a
1∫
0
x∫
0
(x − y)(n − 1)yn−2 dy dx = a
n(n + 1) .
For the expected upward impulse E+ we obtain
E+ =
∫
2
(x − ay)f (x)f (y)dx dy =
1∫
0
y∫
ay
(x − ay)(n − 1)yn−2 dx dy
(1 − a)2(n − 1)=
2(n + 1) .
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E+ = λE−.
This impulse balance equation is a quadratic equation for the slope a of the bid function.
We obtain
a = 1 + λ
n(n − 1) −
√(
1 + λ
n(n − 1)
)2
− 1.
The solution for a is in the interval (0, 1) for all positive values of the downward impulse
weight λ. The other root of the quadratic equation is greater than 1 and therefore outside
the interval of admissible values for a.
4.4. Weighted impulse balance equilibrium under treatment NF
Under treatment NF the expected number of downward impulses P− is
P− = 1
n
.
This is due to the fact that all bidders use the same bid function and therefore have the
same chance 1/n of winning the auction. The expected number of upward impulses P+ is
equal to the probability mass of the region 2:
P+ =
∫
2
f (x)f (y)dx dy =
1∫
0
y∫
ay
(n − 1)yn−2 dx dy = (1 − a)(n − 1)
n
.
Weighted IBE requires
P+ = λP−.
This is a linear equation for a. We obtain
a = 1 − λ
n − 1 ,
where a is in the interval (0, 1) if 0 < λ < n − 1. In our experiments we have n = 2 which
means that we must have λ < 1 if a is positive.
5. Explaining the experimental regularities
5.1. Explaining overbidding
In the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, the bidding function is b(v) = (n − 1)v/n. Over-
bidding therefore requires a > (n − 1)/n . Depending on the value of the downward
impulse weight λ the IBE predicts overbidding. Let us turn first to treatment F and as-
sume a > (n − 1)/n. Then we have
a n − 1 (1 − a)2(n − 1) n − 1
E− =
n(n + 1) > n2(n + 1) and E+ = 2(n + 1) < 2n2(n + 1) .
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λ = E+
E−
<
1
2
.
Thus, under treatment F overbidding results in weighted IBE if and only if λ is smaller
than 1/2. Under treatment NF, on the other hand, a > (n − 1)/n is equivalent to 1 − λ/
(n − 1) > (n − 1)/n and therefore to λ < (n − 1)/n. This condition is necessary and
sufficient for overbidding in IBE under treatment NF.
In sum, overbidding requires λ < 1 regardless of whether we look at treatment F or
NF, and regardless of the number of bidders n > 1. This means that upward impulses must
be given more weight than downward ones. The root of this asymmetry—and therefore
of overbidding—may be the social comparison process described in Section 3.2 that ex-
plains why forgoing profits by paying ‘too much’ and winning the auction yields a weaker
response than forgoing profits by bidding ‘too little’ and losing the auction.
5.2. Explaining the feedback effect
We now turn to the observation that under treatment F bids tend to be lower than under
treatment NF. We show that this effect follows from impulse balance theory if the down-
ward impulse weight is in the region connected to overbidding. Let S− be the conditional
expectation of the amount of the downward impulse under the condition that such an im-
pulse occurs. Similarly, let S+ be the conditional expectation of the amount of an upward
impulse if it occurs. We have
S− = E−
P−
= a
n + 1 and S+ =
E+
P+
= (1 − a)n
2(n + 1) .
Thus, S− > S+ ⇔ a/(1 − a) > n/2, which holds if a > n/(n + 2). Since n/(n + 2) 
(n − 1)/n for all n > 1, overbidding implies that the conditional average amount of a
downward impulse is larger than the conditional average amount of an upward impulse.
This explains the treatment effect. Because conditional downward impulses (S−) are al-
ways larger than conditional upward impulses (S+), taking into account both amount and
numbers of impulses yields on average a stronger downward impulse than taking into ac-
count only the numbers. In other words, subjects whose behaviors follow the principles
of impulse balance and who cannot observe the relative size of downward and upward
impulses behave as if they systematically underestimate downward impulses. As a conse-
quence, bids under treatment NF are higher than bids under treatment F .
5.3. Quantitative estimation and prediction
On the basis of our data we close our discussion of the weighted IBE with a rough
estimate of the value of the parameter λ. We use the relationship between the slope a and
the weight λ and insert the average slope a¯ in our data. This is done for each treatment
separately. We obtain λ = (1 − a¯)/(2a¯) = 0.32 for treatment F , and λ = 1 − a¯ = 0.37 for
treatment NF. Both treatments yield slightly different estimates of λ which seem to be near
enough to each other, however, in order to justify the assumption that the two values of λ
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are the same for both treatments. Accordingly, we estimate λ as the average λ = 0.34 of
both estimates.12
Based on this estimate of λ, Fig. 3 shows empirical and theoretical values of average
relative bids for both treatments in our experiments and those of Isaac and Walker (1985),
who used a comparable experimental design except for the number of bidders (2 in our
and 4 in Isaac and Walker’s experiment) and that values changed from round to round
(whereas in our experiment they changed from week to week). Overbidding and lower
slopes for treatment F are correctly reproduced for both experiments. Furthermore, we
obtain a good quantitative fit of our data. Actual average bids are 57 and 63 percent for
treatments F and NF, respectively, while predicted average bids are 58 and 62 percent,
respectively. Using the estimate of the downward impulse weight λ from our data, we also
correctly predict the average relative bid under Isaac and Walker’s NF treatment, and only
somewhat underestimate the average relative bid under their F treatment. Actual values
are 84 and 89 percent for treatments F and NF, respectively, while predicted values are 79
and 89 percent, respectively.
6. Conclusions
A key lesson drawn from the economic design of auctions is that the details of market
rules can substantially affect outcomes (e.g., Klemperer, 2002; Milgrom, 2003; Roth and
12 Whether the parameter should be, theoretically, constant across treatments or not must eventually depend on
its exact interpretation. Our interpretation of λ as reflecting a concern for social comparison suggests a constant
value. However, there is no reason to assume that λ cannot change with experiment design parameters such as,
say, the framing of the setting.
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feedback about the market participants’ historic behavior should be given.13
This paper introduces the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium that in-
corporates a concern for social comparison and avoids the specification of a full-fledged
learning model. Weighted impulse balance equilibrium correctly predicts lower average
relative bids and thus lower revenues when feedback on losing bids is available on the as-
sumption that the downward impulse weight is in the range where overbidding occurs. The
role of feedback cannot be explained by optimization approaches because the additional
feedback on the losing bid supplied under treatment F is irrelevant for the maximization
of profits on the basis of the rules of the game. Note that this feedback is also incon-
sequential for pure reinforcement theories in which probabilities of bids only depend on
experienced past profits (Roth and Erev, 1995). An adequate explanation of bidding be-
havior seems to require a picture of human learning that is neither completely mechanistic
nor hyper-rationalistic. Simple processes of cause and reasoning, as the ex-post rationality
principle used in learning direction theory, seems to be an adequate approach.
The theory of weighted impulse balance equilibrium shows that quantitative behavioral
equilibrium concepts can be devised which may serve as benchmarks in the evaluation of
experiments. A particularly simple application would be private-value second-price auc-
tions. There, the Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies (bidding one’s value) is
also an impulse balance equilibrium because in equilibrium there are no lost opportuni-
ties and the winner’s payoffs can never be increased by bidding less than one’s value.14
However, the impulse equilibrium concept is in principle applicable to all games in which
players repeatedly decide on one parameter and in which the feedback environment allows
conclusions about what would have been the better choice in the last period.
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Instructions
General information
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions. If at any time you have questions, raise
your hand and a monitor will assist you. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of
any nature with other participants is prohibited.
During the session you will participate in auctions that will give you an opportunity to make money. You
will be paid your earnings plus a DM 10 show up fee at the end of the session. Decisions and payments are
confidential: No other participant will be told about your actions during the game or the amount of money you
make.
Description of the game
Each participant will have the opportunity to submit one bid in each of 140 subsequent auctions. In each
auction, there will be exactly two bidders. The higher bid wins. The winner receives a payoff, the loser receives
nothing in that auction.
What is the value of the item auctioned off to me?
The precise value of the (fictitious) item differs across bidders and between auctions. However, in each auc-
tion, before you submit your bid, you will be told exactly what the commodity is worth to you, i.e., what DM
amount we will pay you if you win the auction. Specifically, your value is randomly drawn such that each value
between 0.00 and 100.00 money units has the same probability of being drawn. The values of all bidders are inde-
pendently determined, so that generally each bidder has a different value. (But you will not know the values of the
other bidders.) The value does not change for five auctions. After every five auctions, new values are randomly
drawn for all bidders.
What will my earnings be?
If you submit the higher bid in an auction, you win. Your payment from this game is then your value minus
your bid. (Therefore, bids higher than your value may lead to losses and are therefore not allowed.) In case your
bid is smaller than the bid of your opponent, you lose and will not receive any payment for this auction. In case
of a tie, a chance move randomly determines the winner. Your earnings, which are paid at the end of the session,
are the sum of payments over all 140 auctions. Each money unit earned in the auction is worth 2 Pfennige.
Who is the other bidder?
All pairings are anonymous. Your identity will not be revealed to the persons you are playing with either
before, during or after the game. In each auction, your opponent will be selected randomly. However, you will not
be paired with the same person twice in a row. Note that by this matching scheme, the values of your (changing)
opponents generally also change from round to round.
[TREATMENT F ] What feedback is there after each auction?
After each round you will be informed as to whether you won the auction, the price (i.e., the winning bid),
the opponent’s bid, and your payment from that auction.
[TREATMENT NF] What feedback is there after each auction?
After each round you will be informed as to whether you won the auction, the price (i.e., the winning bid),
and your payment from that auction.
Good luck!
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